The Efficacy of Legal Constraints In The Context of Executive Power.

This paper will speak about the extent of efficacy of constitutional determinations as a translational and implementational mechanism.

In the midst of the process of political formulization that occurred in the United States in The 18^th Century and globally in the last century, there has been observed a concerted effort in the imposition of safeguards against individualistic powers of the Executive. In many countries, it has taken place through the separation of powers while in some, like our very own, the mechanism of deriving the executive branch of government from the popularly elected Parliament has been utilized. It seems as if the post-democratic global community has decided that the executive can not be trusted, that a regular reshuffling of the bowl of power-wielders is critical, that it is unaffordable to allow one individual or groups of like-minded individuals to engrain themselves so deeply in the fabric of state functioning that the state and its ‘temporary’ representatives become one in the same.

However, a fascinating observation is that the endeavor has been only partially successful, which goes on to suggest that, maybe, it is insufficient and intrinsically deficient.  

Interesting questions are raised. How effective a role does any formal device maintain in the monitoring of anything? For example, if, in the case of Pakistan, the executive is constitutionally mandated to be an elected individual from the political corridors of power, does that legal and constitutional determination translate into ground realities? It is rhetorical to ask whether it should, but it is quite questionable whether it does. In the case of Pakistan, the determination process of future policy and (the more abstract) ‘way forward’ is a topic of strong public contention and debate. It is the understanding of an unignorably significant proportion of the population that political decision making is driven from Rawalpindi (Pakistani military hub) instead of Islamabad, and policy implementation is perversely manipulated by a tightly-knit family of state machinery called the Civil Service.

While the Prime Minister is intended by the Bhutto constitution to be the Chief Executive under whom, employed by whom and answerable to whom the Military Executives and Executive Bureaucrats function, it appears as if the mere constitutional verdict is insufficient in achieving the motive. I wonder what else needs to be done in order to ensure real implementation of the vision of the constitution regarding the Executive of the State of Pakistan.